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In addition to the parties shown on the cover of this Brief 
of Appellee, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, there have been 
other individuals or entities which have been a party to this 
case. The following individuals were dismissed as third-party 
defendants by Zandra Perkins without admission of any liability 
or compromise of Ms. Perkins7 claims against them: 
Eugene Peterson 
Allen J. Muelstein 
Wynn Scott Hansen 
Ernest D. Wright 
Donald M. White 
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In addition, the following entity assigned its claim to 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) on the basis that 
the judgments and order from which the appellants seek relief are 
final orders issued by the Third District Court and on the basis 
that the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction over these judgments and order. This Court, 
however, obtained jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-
2(4) and 78-2A-3(2)(k) and Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The final order of the District Court, following post 
trial motions was entered on September 3, 1993. Appellant First 
General Services filed a timely notice of appeal on October 4, 
1993. Perkins7 cross-appeal was timely filed on October 18, 
1993, pursuant to Rule 4(d), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Jurisdiction therefore lies with this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues presented to this Court by Perkins7 cross-appeal 
are as follows: 
I. Issue No. 1 
Did the trial court correctly allow evidence that 
Perkins admitted, in her deposition, starting a fire at her 
Hillsden residence in January, 1987. 
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a. Standard of Review 
A trial court's decision regarding admission of 
evidence is reviewed to determine whether the Court abused its 
discretion. Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution. 
605 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979); Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
James. 845 F.2d 315, 320 (11th Cir. 1988). 
II. Issue No. 2 
Did the trial court correctly allow evidence that the 
May 1990 fire in the Perkins7 Murray home may have been 
intentionally set. 
a. Standard of Review 
A trial court,s decision regarding admission of 
evidence is reviewed to determine whether the Court abused its 
discretion. Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution. 
605 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979); Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
James. 845 F.2d 315, 320 (11th Cir. 1988). 
III. Issue No. 3 
Did the trial court error in the way it handled the 
issue of insurance fraud. 
a. Standard of Review: 
The decision of the trial court regarding improper 
comments by counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Donohue 
2 
v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 748 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1987); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. James. 835 F.2d 315 (11th Cir.). 
b. Issued Preserved on Appeal: 
Bear River maintains that Perkins did not preserve 
this issue on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
On May 19, 1990, a fire occurred at Perkins' home in Murray, 
Utah. The fire caused damage to the carport, a portion of the 
roof and the north wall of the house and caused smoke damage 
throughout the home. Perkins immediately notified her homeowners 
insurance company, Bear River. Perkins contracted with First 
General Services to perform certain construction and repair work 
on Perkins' home. First General Services subcontracted work to 
Kent Frampton dba Frampton Heating and Air Conditioning 
("Frampton") to install an evaporative cooler on the roof of 
Perkins' home. 
First General Services commenced this action against Perkins 
for breach of contract and to foreclose a mechanic's lien. (R. 2 
-9). A parallel mechanic's lien foreclosure and breach of 
contract action was commenced by Frampton against Perkins and 
First General Services. These two cases were consolidated in the 
trial court and tried concurrently. (R. 371-396). Perkins 
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denied liability to Frampton and asserted a counterclaim against 
Frampton for damages on account of Frampton7s negligence in 
performing his work, (R. 386-389). 
Perkins denied liability to First General Services and 
asserted a counterclaim against First General Services seeking 
damages for breach of contract of approximately $111,000. In 
addition, Perkins filed a Third-Party Complaint against Eugene 
Peterson of First General Services, for breach of contract, 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, slander of title, conversion, 
unjust enrichment, and constructive trust. In addition, Perkins 
filed a Third-Party Complaint against Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company, as well as several of the directors and claims adjustors 
of Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, alleging negligent 
misrepresentation, negligence, breach of duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, breach of contract, indemnification, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and conversion and seeking 
damages of approximately $450,000. (R. 14-83). 
During pre-trial proceedings, all of the individual 
defendants were dismissed from the case. (R. 572-592). 
II. Course of Proceedings. 
This case was commenced by First General Services on 
October 18, 1990, by filing a complaint seeking recovery of the 
sum of $10,658.47 (R. 2-10). Zandra Perkins filed an answer and 
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counterclaim against First General and a third-party complaint 
against Bear River and various individuals associated with Bear 
River. The counterclaim sought amounts of approximately $111,000 
from First General Services as well as an amount of approximately 
$450,000 from Bear River and several of its directors and claims 
adjustors. (R. 14-84). Ultimately, after significant effort and 
time, Perkins dismissed or dropped her claims against all of the 
individual third-party defendants. Frampton who held a 
mechanic's lien on Perkins' home filed an action in Circuit Court 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The Frampton case was 
consolidated with the First General Service case on or about 
September 23, 1991. (R. 375-396). The consolidated cases then 
proceeded to trial from which this appeal is taken. 
A nine day jury trial was conducted from April 19, 1993 
through April 30, 1993. The jury returned a special verdict (R. 
1577-1599), separately responding to questions regarding the case 
between First General and Perkins and Perkins against Bear River. 
With respect to the claims against First General and Perkins the 
jury responded as follows: 
(1) Perkins breached her contract with First General; 
(2) Perkins was not unjustly enriched by First General; 
(3) The reasonable value of cleaning and restoration 
due to First General from Perkins is $10,658.47; and 
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(4) Reasonable attorney7s fees and costs due First 
General from Perkins is $52,522.53. 
(5) First General did not breach its contract with Perkins; 
(6) First General did not make negligent 
misrepresentations to Perkins; 
(7) First General did not commit fraud against 
Perkins; and 
(8) First General did not commit slander of title 
against Perkins. 
The jury found with respect to the claims of Perkins against 
Bear River as follows: 
(1) Bear River did not breach its contract with Perkins; 
(2) Bear River did not act in bad faith; 
(3) Bear River did not overpay monies to or on behalf 
of Perkins; and 
(4) Bear River owed $5,100 to Perkins for damages 
resulting in the May, 1990 fire. 
After hearing Perkins7 Objection to The Form of the Proposed 
Judgment, the Court entered two judgments on July 6, 1993 
specifically based on the jury's special verdict. One judgment 
related to the claims of Zandra Perkins against Bear River (R. 
1569-1572), and the other judgment related to the claims against 
First General Services and Zandra Perkins. 
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In addition Ms. Perkins objected to the Court's award of 
costs to Bear River. The matter was briefed and argued post-
judgment. In addition to the dispute regarding the award of 
costs to Bear River, the parties filed the following formal post 
trial motions: 
(1) Zandra Perkins filed a Motion for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict or in the alternative Motion for New Trial; 
(2) Frampton filed a motion to amend its judgment to 
include additional attorney's fees; and 
(3) First General Services filed a Motion to Amend the 
Judgment to include additional attorney's fees after the second 
day of trial. 
A hearing on all post trial motions and the award of costs 
to Bear River was held on August 5, 1993. At the end of that 
hearing the trial court ruled on each of those motions from the 
bench. Specifically, the trial court ruled: 
(1) Perkins' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict was granted in part and denied in part; 
(2) Perkins' Motion for a New Trial was denied; 
(3) The attorney's fees and costs award by the jury to 
First General Services was reduced from $52,522.53 to 
the principal amount of First General's claim 
($10,658.47); 
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(4) First General's Motion to Amend the Judgment to 
include additional attorney's fees was denied; 
(5) First General was ordered to pay the Frampton 
judgment entered against Zandra Perkins on Frampton's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, including Frampton's 
attorney's fees under the Mechanic's lien statute; 
(6) Frampton's Motion to Amend his Judgment to Include 
Additional Attorney's Fees in defending against 
Perkins' offset claims was denied; and 
(7) Costs would be limited to filing fees and 
deposition costs for opposing parties and opposing 
parties expert witnesses. 
(R. 1774-1779 and 5168). 
Over First General Service's objections, final order and 
judgment which purports to incorporate the trial court's bench 
ruling was entered on September 3, 1993. First General Services 
appealed from that order of September 3, 1993. The Notice of 
Appeal was timely and properly filed by First General Services on 
October 4, 1993. Both Perkins and Frampton filed timely cross 
appeals on October 6, 1993 and October 18, 1993, respectfully. 
(R. 1801-1803, 1809-1813). 
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III. Statement of Facts. 
1. On May 19, 1990, a fire partially destroyed a home 
located at 5510 South 640 West, Murray, Utah, owned by Zandra 
Perkins ("Perkins"). (R. 517-576, 639). Prior to, and at the 
time of the fire, Zandra Perkins was temporarily living and 
working in Arizona. The home was not occupied. (R. 4863, 4894-
95) . 
2. Perkins' home was insured against fire losses by Bear 
River Mutual Insurance Company ("Bear River"). (R. 517, 576). 
Bear River's insurance policy contained policy limits for 
dwelling of $85,000, for unscheduled personal property 
("contents") of $59,500 and an additional living expense policy 
limit of $17,000. (R. 68). 
3. Just days after the May 19, 1990 fire, Bear River 
learned that Perkins had a previous fire in a home on Hillsden 
Drive in Salt Lake City, Utah, in January of 1987. Bear River 
learned that Perkins had set the Hillsden home on fire. (R. 
4291). Perkins had a previous fire at her Murray home in March 
of 1990 for which Perkins made a claim under her policy with Bear 
River. Bear River also learned from the Murray City Fire 
Department that the May 19, 1990 fire was being investigated as 
suspicious. Bear River knew Perkins had the two previous fires, 
yet Bear River immediately issued a draft on the loss for 
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additional living expenses on May 21, 1990, and made no effort to 
delay because of the suspicious origin of the fire. (R. 4541-
4532). 
4. After being contacted by Perkins, Richard Dio ("Dio"), 
the adjustor from Bear River met with Perkins at her home on May 
21, 1990. (R. 3140, 3159). During Dio's visit with Perkins, Dio 
presented Perkins with a Proof of Loss claim form and explained 
to her that the Proof of Loss needed to be submitted within 60 
days from the date of the fire, pursuant to the insurance policy 
provisions. (R. 4299-4300). A Proof of Loss provides the 
insurance company with a description of the loss, how the loss 
occurred and how much the damages were, and provides the insurer 
with some indication that the loss was legitimate. (R. 4299-
4300, 4549). It was Perkins' responsibility to see that the 
Proof of Loss was properly submitted to Bear River within the 60 
days. (R. 75). Perkins' own expert stated that an insurance 
company has a right to stand on the terms of is policy. 
(R. 4106). Perkins did not file a Proof of Loss during the first 
three months following the fire at her home. (R. 4300-4549). 
5. During Dio's discussions with Perkins on May 21, 1990, 
Perkins requested contractor names from Dio. Dio gave her two 
references to contractors who were geographically located near 
Perkins' home. (R. 3144). That same day, Perkins called Eugene 
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Peterson of First General Services and asked if Peterson would 
come and take a look at the home. (R. 3505). Peterson met with 
Perkins at her home on May 22, 1990 at 10:00 a.m. During that 
meeting, Peterson did a scope of the damage. (R. 5306). On that 
same day, Peterson presented an Access and Authorization card to 
Perkins and explained to Perkins that the purpose of the Access 
and Authorization card was to evidence that First General 
Services worked for Perkins and not for the insurance company, to 
give First General Services the authorization to do the work and, 
to allow the insurance company to include First General Serviced 
name on any checks or drafts that they would issue on behalf of 
the claim. (R. 5315). The following day, May 23, 1990, Peterson 
again met with Perkins at her home and was introduced to Perkins' 
sister, Marsha Smith ("Smith"). (R. 5315). Mr. Peterson 
subsequently received the Access and Authorization card signed by 
Perkins on May 24, 1990. (R. 5316). 
6. Peterson prepared a scope of damage and estimated that 
the total price to repair the dwelling would be $50,709.91. (R. 
2889). Peterson estimated that because of the limited fire 
damage and smoke damage in the home, that the contents in the 
home could be cleaned at a total price of $1,940.24. (R. 2889). 
Peterson's estimate to repair and restore the dwelling was 
reasonable in light of industry standards. (R. 3201, 3210). 
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7. In the middle of June, 1990, Bear River advanced 
$10,000 to First General Services to provide seed money to First 
General Services so that the restoration work could continue. 
Bear River advanced another $10,000 to First General Services in 
July for restoration work. (R. 4542, 4544, Third-Party Defendant 
Exhibit 131). 
8. Between the date Perkins signed the contract, and July 
13, 1990, neither Perkins nor Smith ever complained about the 
work being performed by First General Services either in terms of 
its quality or the timeliness of its completion. (R. 2895). 
During one of the visits by Perkins on or about July 13, 1990, 
she met with Peterson at her home. At that time, she requested 
that First General Services convert the carport to a garage and 
bill the insurance company for the work. Peterson stated that 
First General Services would be willing to do the work to convert 
the carport to a garage, but that it would not bill the insurance 
company for that work, for to do so would be insurance fraud. 
(R. 2891-2895). Following the July 13, 1990, meeting, Perkins 
and Smith began complaining about First General Service's work on 
the home. (R. 2895-2896). 
9. On July 30, 1990, Perkins terminated First General 
Services' contract and insisted that it perform no further work 
on the project. (R. 2912-2913). At the time Perkins terminated 
12 
First General Services, First General Services claimed that 
Perkins still owed them $10,658.47, (R. 2937). Perkins, 
immediately after terminating First General Services, gave Bear 
River strict orders not to pay any more money to First General 
Services. (R. 4323). On September 27, 1990, First General 
Services filed a Notice of Lien on Perkins' home asserting a 
Mechanic's Lien for Perkins failure to pay the balance due and 
owing. (R. 6). On October 18, 1990, First General Services 
filed a Complaint in which they moved to foreclose the Mechanic's 
Lien and brought an action against Perkins for breach of 
Contract. (R. 2-13). 
10. In September of 1990, Don White, of Bear River, at 
Perkins' request, asked Peterson to remove the lien First General 
Services had placed on Perkins' home. However, First General 
Services refused to remove the lien. (R. 4306-4307). 
11. Perkins did not submit her first claim for contents 
until early September, 1990. Perkins submitted a document to 
Bear River which contained numerous pages of items she was 
claiming were damaged or destroyed in the fire under the contents 
portion of the Bear River policy. (R. 4301-4302). Bear River 
immediately responded to Perkins' content claim by informing 
Perkins that the claim was insufficient, that it lacked 
supporting documentation and that the individual content 
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descriptions lacked the necessary information which would enable 
Bear River to verify the replacement cost of the items. 
(R. 4306). 
12. Despite Perkins inadequate and unsubstantiated content 
claim, Bear River advanced $10,000 to Perkins to be applied to 
contents in October of 1990. (R. 4316). Perkins was informed 
that the $10,000 was an advance on contents and that Bear River 
was advancing the $10,000 even though sufficient documentation 
had not been provided to Bear River to justify any payment of the 
content claim. (R. 4316). Perkins was informed on several 
occasions by Bear River that Bear River was only required, under 
the policy, to pay actual cash value for Perkins' alleged content 
claim, and that replacement value would not be paid to Perkins 
until she submitted evidence of proof of replacement. (R. 4320). 
13. Bear River did make content payments to Perkins for 
actual cash value in a total amount of $35,953.00. (R. 4077). 
14. Perkins' own expert admitted that to pay a contents 
claim an insurance company would need at a minimum a brand name 
for the content item claimed, the make of model of the 
content item, the year it was purchased and the approximate 
amount that the insured paid for the content item. (R. 4194). 
15. On November 6, 1990, Bear River, because of the threat 
of impending litigation, hired an independent insurance adjustor, 
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Bradley Bloom ("Bloom"), in an attempt to bring Perkins' claim to 
a resolution. (R. 4442) . In attempting to bring a resolution to 
Perkins' content claim, Bloom reviewed the documentation that had 
been provided to Bear River by Perkins. Bloom determined that he 
would need more information from Perkins to adequately adjust the 
content claim. Bloom recognized that the descriptions provided 
by Perkins for many of the content items lacked sufficient 
description to even adjust the claim. (R. 4446-4448). At the 
time Bloom was working with Victor Lawrence, attorney for 
Perkins, to try to settle the contents claim before they moved on 
to the claims for the dwelling and additional living expenses. 
(R. 4450) . Lawrence expressed concern to Bloom that the 180 day 
time limit for obtaining replacement cost by Perkins was running 
out. Bloom suggested to Bear River that Bear River extend the 
180 day time period for Perkins to obtain replacement value of 
her contents. (R. 4452-4454). Bloom offered to settle the 
content claim at a replacement value of $47,836.77. Bear River 
agreed that Perkins would have 90 days from the date of 
settlement of the content claim to replace the content items to 
receive full replacement value. (R. 4454, 4460). Bear River 
agreed that a 25% depreciation would be applied and that Perkins 
would receive 75% of the $47,836.77 with the remaining 25% to be 
paid upon proof of replacement. (R. 4461). 
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16. Perkins responded to Bear River's offer on January 7, 
1991, demanding that she receive $52,644.95 immediately. Perkins 
demanded that Bear River pay this amount as full replacement cost 
without requiring Perkins to show proof of replacement. In 
addition, Perkins demanded that her additional living expenses be 
paid by the insurance company per her demand of $19,000, which 
was $2,000 above policy limits. (R. 4462). Bear River refused 
to pay Perkins' additional living expenses as demanded and 
refused to pay Perkins for replacement value on her contents 
claim without Perkins replacing the items and showing proof of 
replacement. (R. 4462-4465). 
17. On January 8, 1991, Perkins filed a Third-Party 
Complaint against Bear River alleging that Bear River had 
breached its contract and alleged that Bear River did so in bad 
faith. (R. 14). 
18. Bear River was prevented from settling the content 
claim because Perkins demanded that she receive replacement cost 
without replacing the items and because she demanded that her 
additional living expense be paid without question. Bear River 
instructed Bloom to adhere to the policy provisions and require 
proof of replacement before replacement costs would be paid for 
contents. (R. 4320). Perkins never submitted any documentation 
of proof of replacement. (R. 4321-4322). Perkins' own expert 
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admitted that the delay in resolving the contents claim was 
caused by Perkins' demand for replacement cost without having to 
establish proof of replacement. (R. 4064). Perkins' expert 
admitted that Bear River's extension of the 180 replacement 
period was an act of good faith on Bear River's part. (R. 4065). 
Perkins' expert also admitted that Bear River would be justified 
in not paying replacement cost until the items were replaced. 
(R. 4073). 
19. Bear River paid toward Perkins' dwelling claims the 
total amount of $54,609.00. (R. 4077). The evidence clearly 
indicated that the reasonable value of Perkins' dwelling claim 
was approximately $50,000. (R. 2889, 3201, 3210). Perkins 
continued to demand policy limits of $85,000 on her dwelling 
claim. (R. 48). 
20. After First General Services was terminated on July 30, 
1990, Leo Thorup ("Thorup") was retained by Perkins to act as 
general contractor. (R. 3580). Bear River was informed in 
October of 1990 of Thorup's involvement. (R. 3750). Dio 
attempted to find out what work Thorup was going to do on the 
home and what he was going to charge Perkins for that work 
immediately after finding out of Thorup's involvement. (R. 3750-
3751). 
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21. After Bear River discovered Thorup's involvement in the 
restoration of Perkins7 home, Bear River demanded that Thorup 
provide a bid to Bear River. Bear River received a statement 
from Thorup the first of November, 1990. Immediately Dio called 
Thorup and requested a break down on what Dio thought was a bid. 
(R. 3758-3759). Thorup admitted at trial that most of the work 
set forth on his statement received by Bear River the first of 
November, 1990, had been completed before the statement had been 
sent to Bear River. (R. 3621). Thorup never did provide a 
breakdown of this statement. (R. 3759-3761). Bear River did not 
receive anything from Thorup until January 22, 1991. (R. 3761-
3763). 
22. After receiving Thorup's invoice on January 22, 1991, 
Bloom, representing Bear River, met with Thorup at Thorup's home 
on January 29, 1991. (R. 3629). On Thorup's invoice was a claim 
for overhead and profit. Thorup admitted, however, during that 
meeting, that he had nothing to do with a substantial portion of 
his bill and should not be claiming profit or overhead for part 
of his invoice. (R. 3629) . In fact, Thorup admitted agreeing 
with Bloom that if Bear River would pay him $4,000 it would be in 
complete settlement of Thorup's claim against Bear River. (R. 
3630). Thorup also admitted at trial that approximately $8,000 
of amounts on his invoice were going back to Perkins. (R. 3634). 
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In fact, Thorup testified that Bear River still owed him $38,000 
and that he was going to give the entire $38,000 back to Perkins, 
(R. 3635) . 
23. Bear River was prevented from settling the dwelling 
claim because of the dispute between Perkins and First General 
Services and because of the lack of documentation from Thorup. 
(R. 3320). Perkins gave Bear River a strict order not to pay any 
more money to First General Services and this created an 
untenable position to Bear River. (R. 4323, 4059, 4063). 
24. Bear River clearly had no duty to supervise Perkins' 
general contractors. (R. 4562-4563) . The reasonable bid to 
restore Perkins' dwelling was approximately $50,000. Bear River 
paid in excess of $54,000. (R. 4565). Bear River's dwelling 
payments were reasonable based on the evidence that Bear River 
had regarding Perkins' dwelling claims. (R. 4565). 
25. In October of 1990, Perkins made a claim for additional 
living expenses. Upon receipt of Perkins claim, Bear River 
immediately notified Perkins that her additional living expense 
claim needed to be supported with invoices and proof that Perkins 
had incurred the additional living expense. (R. 4310-4311). 
26. In response to Bear River's demand, Perkins had her 
mother send invoices to Bear River indicating that she had 
charged Perkins $50.00 a day for a room in her mother's home for 
19 
158 days from the date of the fire through November 6, 1990. (R. 
3465, 3466). Perkins7 mother also charged Perkins $20.00 a day 
for 108 days for meals provided to Perkins while allegedly 
staying at her mother's home. (R. 3466). In addition, Perkins' 
mother charged Perkins $9.90 a day for 136 days relating to 
laundry services. (R. 3461, Third-Party Defendant Exhibit 77 and 
78). Perkins admitted at trial that she was not in town for more 
than 5 weeks during the time period that her mother charged her 
for room and board and laundry services. (R. 3467-3468). 
27. While on the witness stand at trial, Perkins withdrew 
her claim for additional living expenses relating to the invoices 
submitted by her mother. (R. 3462). 
28. Because Bear River knew that Perkins was out of town 
during the time that Perkins' mother was charging her for room 
and board and for laundry service, Perkins' additional living 
expense claim was never settled because Bear River rejected her 
claim. (R. 4324). 
29. Bear River bent over backwards to adjust this difficult 
claim. Bear River's handling of the claim was fair and Bear 
River went beyond what one would normally expect. (R. 4567). 
Bear River paid in total, to Perkins or on her behalf, 
$91,062.00. (R. 4073, 4077). Bear River made payments 
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throughout the process of Perkins' loss and before adequate 
documentation was presented. (R. 4573). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly admitted limited evidence of the 
1987 Hillsden fire and evidence that the May 19, 1990 fire was 
intentionally set. This evidence was totally relevant to Bear 
River's defenses to Perkins' bad faith claims and evidence of 
good faith. Further, this relevant evidence had little if any 
effect on the outcome of the trial. Clearly, any prejudicial 
effect on Perkins did not substantially outweigh the probative 
value of the evidence. It is dispositive that the trial judge 
himself recognized the evidence regarding the 1987 Hillsden fire, 
in the limited scope that it was presented to the jury, had 
little if any impact on the trial, and did not unfairly prejudice 
Perkins. 
Even assuming the trial court did commit error with regard 
to the 1987 fire and the May 19, 1990 fire the error was 
harmless. The evidence at trial overwhelming proves that Bear 
River not only acted in complete good faith, but in fact bent 
over backwards to adjust Perkins claims and in so doing paid to 
Perkins more than $91,000. The evidence clearly shows that it 
was Perkins' non-compliance with the policy of insurance and her 
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unreasonable demands which prevented a more speedy resolution of 
her claims. 
Mention of insurance fraud by counsel for Bear River in its 
opening statement did not warrant a mistrial. Counsel for 
Perkins made a motion for mistrial or in the alternative for the 
judge to admonish the jury. The trial judge did admonish the 
jury by reading verbatim a statement which had been prepared and 
agreed to by counsel for Perkins. No further mention of insur-
ance fraud was made during the course of trial. Consequently, 
Perkins has not preserved her right to appeal on this issue. The 
trial judge did exactly as requested by Perkins7 counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Allowed Limited Evidence of 
the 1987 Hillsden Fire and the Suspicious Nature of the 
May 1990 Fire. 
a. Evidence of the Hillsden Fire and the suspicious nature 
of the May 19, 1990 fire was Relevant to the Issues in 
the case. 
When an insured brings a cause of action for bad faith 
against an insurance company, the insurer is entitled to present 
evidence on the issue of its good faith. Steinberg's Department 
Store v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.. 407 N.E.2d 124 (111. 1980). 
Perkins brought suit against Bear River, claiming Bear River 
acted in bad faith in handling the May 19, 1990 fire claim, 
despite the undisputed evidence that Bear River paid Perkins more 
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than $91,000 under her policy. As part of Bear River's defense 
to the claim of bad faith it was entitled to show that it made 
payment on the 1990 fire claim even though it knew Perkins had 
had a prior fire which she herself started and even though it 
knew that the May 1990 fire was suspicious. Knowledge of the 
1987 Hillsden fire started by Perkins would have given Bear River 
valid reason to question the legitimacy of the 1990 fire claim. 
Evidence of the 1987 fire at Perkins' Hillsden residence and the 
suspicious nature of the 1990 fire is highly relevant to the 
issue of Bear River's good faith in the way that it adjusted 
Perkins' claim. 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: "Relevant 
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence." Immediately after the May 19, 1990 fire in 
Perkins' home, Bear River became aware of the 1987 fire at 
Perkins' Hillsden residence. Bear River's knowledge of the 1987 
fire and Perkins' involvement in that fire clearly could raise 
questions about Perkins' entitlement to coverage for the 1990 
fire and could also have had an impact upon the manner in which 
Bear River adjusted the May 19, 1990 fire. 
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The fact that Bear River immediately dispersed funds to 
Perkins and to First General Services, despite having knowledge 
of the 1987 fire and Perkins involvement in that fire is evidence 
of Bear River7s good faith towards Perkins and the manner in 
which it adjusted her claim. The issue of the 1987 fire was 
brought to the attention of the trial court through the filing by 
Perkins7 of a Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Prior 
Criminal Conviction. (R. 794-796). Perkins argued that the 1987 
conviction for reckless burning had been expunged and was 
therefore fundamentally inadmissible. (R. 795). When that 
matter came on for hearing before the trial court, the trial 
court ruled as follows: 
The second motion, Perkins7 Motion to Exclude Prior 
Criminal Convictions, I would rule this way: I would 
grant the motion to stop any testimony as to her being 
convicted, both as to burning and also as to 
shoplifting. I would deny the motion as to whether she 
had intentionally set the fire. 
In other words, what I am saying, is that I don't think 
criminal convictions are material, but I think the 
intentional setting of the fire as a defense does go to 
it. 
(R. 32747). 
The issue was again raised by counsel for Perkins following 
the enpanelment of the jury on the first day of trial. (R. 5277-
5286). After hearing argument from Perkins7 counsel and Bear 
River7s counsel, the court stated as follows: 
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The court does remember the last argument as far as 
what you are saying, what the insurance company did as 
far as its investigating into, and the argument made by 
Mr. Heath. 
The court does not feel that it has heard anything 
different than what it heard before in this matter, and 
is still of the opinion that if a claim is therefore 
made for bad faith, they're entitled to go into this to 
show the defense of the claim for bad faith. 
If that claim were dropped, then I would grant it. But 
I just am still of the opinion that the testimony here 
does not go to anything different than what I was 
thinking at the time; therefore, I would deny the 
motion and let my ruling stand, the prior ruling, and 
allow them to do it, if the claim for bad faith is 
still present. 
And, as I understand it, it is. 
(R. 5285-5286). 
Again, in the afternoon of the first day of trial, counsel 
for Perkins moved for a mistrial on the basis that counsel for 
Bear River stated in its opening statement that Perkins had 
admitted in her deposition that she had an earlier fire in 1987 
at her Hillsden home and had intentionally set the fire. The 
trial court after hearing argument from counsel denied the motion 
for mistrial and stated as follows: 
As far as the other matters are concerned, no, I think 
I understand what's going on on that, and I understand 
what both of you are saying. I still am of the opinion 
that as long as the cause of action is there for bad 
faith, they have the right to be able to rely on that, 
that testimony, and in that event I would deny the 
motion on that. 
(R. 5333). 
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The trial court, due to counsel for Perkins persistence, had 
ample opportunity to consider the relevancy of the 1987 Hillsden 
fire. The trial court carefully examined the issue and excluded 
the irrelevant facts relating to the 1987 fire. However, the 
trial court correctly admitted the relevant facts relating to the 
1987 fire and the suspicious nature of the May 1990 fire and 
allowed Bear River to present evidence of its good faith by 
allowing the jury to hear evidence that Perkins had had an 
earlier fire and that Perkins had admitted that she intentionally 
set that fire. 
Other courts have been faced with the same evidentiary issue 
and have uniformly allowed evidence of previous fires on the 
basis that the evidence is highly relevant to the conduct and the 
manner in which the insurance company adjusted a claim. For 
example, in Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 780 P.2d 116 
(Idaho 1989), an insurer brought an action against his insurance 
company for bad faith denial of fire insurance proceeds. The 
insurance company defended by contending that the insured was 
responsible for intentionally setting a prior fire. The trial 
court allowed Safeco to introduce evidence that the plaintiff had 
sustained a fire loss in 1982. This evidence was received over 
strenuous objection. The appeals court recognized that evidence 
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of the prior fire was critical to the issue of whether Safeco 
acted in bad faith. Id. at 120. 
Clearly, the admission or exclusion of evidence is within 
the sound discretion of the trial judge and the exercise of this 
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing 
of an abuse thereof. Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution. 608 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979). The trial court 
in the case at hand did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
limited evidence of the 1987 fire in Perkins' Hillsden home. In 
fact, some courts have held that excluding such evidence is 
prejudicial error. In Rutledge v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co., 334 S.E.2d 131 (S.C. Appeals 1985), the trial court was 
asked to allow evidence of a previous fire loss sustained by the 
plaintiff. An offer of proof was made by the insurance company 
that the plaintiff had suffered a loss due to fire approximately 
one year before sustaining the loss due to the fire at issue in 
the case. The offer of proof indicated the prior loss occurred, 
as did the one in question, on the insured7s business property 
known as the Fig Leaf Lounge during the early morning hours 
shortly after a business associate of the plaintiff left the 
lounge. The trial court limited consideration of any evidence 
relating to the prior loss solely to the issue of a bad faith 
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refusal by the insurance company to pay insurance benefits to the 
plaintiff. 
The appeals court agreed that the evidence of the prior loss 
was relevant to the issue of the bad faith on the part of the 
insurance companies, however, the appeals court went further and 
indicated that because the insurance company had refused to pay 
insurance benefits because they believed that plaintiff was 
responsible for starting the fire, all the facts relating to the 
previous fire should have been admissible. Id. at 136-137. 
Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden fire, in the limited nature 
that the trial court allowed the evidence to be presented, and 
evidence of the suspicious nature of the May 1990 fire was 
totally relevant to the issues in this case. The fact that 
Perkins was claiming bad faith against Bear River made the 
evidence relevant and the trial court, as did the South Carolina 
trial court, in Rutledge, recognized the relevancy of the prior 
fire as it went to the issue of the insurance company's bad 
faith. 
b. The Probative Value of Evidence of the Previous Fire 
and the Fact that the May 19. 1990 Fire Was Intention-
ally Set Outweighed any Prejudicial Effect to Perkins. 
Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden fire was limited by the trial 
court to a statement that the fire occurred and that Perkins 
admitted that she intentionally set the fire. No evidence of her 
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conviction of reckless burning was allowed and Bear River was 
precluded from asking Perkins why and how she set the Hillsden 
home on fire. Moreover, evidence that the May 1990 fire was 
intentionally set was also limited. The trial court precluded 
any evidence as to who may have set the fire. The jury was only 
allowed to know that the May 1990 fire was suspicious and 
intentionally set. 
The relevance and probative value of this evidence has been 
previously explained. Perkins suggests to this Court that 
evidence of the 1987 fire and evidence of the suspicious nature 
of the May 1990 fire was the only evidence Bear River presented 
in its defense. Nothing could be further from the truth. In 
actuality, though relevant and probative, the limited evidence of 
the 1987 fire and the suspicious nature of the May 1990 fire had 
little, if any, prejudicial effect on Perkins. Ultimately, 
evidence against Perkins7 bad faith claims was so overwhelming 
that the limited evidence of the 1987 fire and the suspicious 
nature of the May 1990 fire (even assuming its admission were 
error) was inconsequential and certainly not the grounds for 
reversal. 
The trial itself lasted for 9 days, yet evidence of the 1987 
Hillsden fire consisted of no more than a total of one half page 
29 
of trial transcript. The Hillsden fire was first mentioned in 
counsel for Bear River's opening statement as follows: 
There is also another Zandra Perkins who also admitted 
in her deposition that she set a home on fire on 
Hillsden Drive, a home that she owned at the time in 
1987. . . (R. 2834). 
The Hillsden fire was again discussed during cross 
examination of Perkins by counsel for Bear River as follows: 
Q: Now also in your deposition you recall admitting that 
you had a prior fire in 1987 at another residence; is 
that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That you admitted you set the fire on that residence on 
Hillsden Drive? 
A: That fire was caused by some carelessness by me. 
Q: Didn't you in fact say in your deposition that you set 
the fire? 
A: I don't recall the words. 
Q: I asked if you didn't say, in your deposition, 
that you didn't know why you set the fire. 
A: I could have. I don't recall. 
(R. 3499-3501). 
The Hillsden fire was again mentioned during direct 
examination by counsel for Bear River of Donald M. White, the 
former loss services manager for Bear River as follows: 
Q: Did information come to you the very next day [May 25, 
1990] that the insured had had a prior fire? 
A: Yes. 
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(R. 4291) 
Finally, the last mention of the 1987 fire occurred in 
direct examination of Captain Hall of the Murray City Fire 
Department as follows: 
Q: Did you have occasion to inform him [Mr. Dio] that 
Zandra Perkins had a record of a previous fire? 
A: Yes yes I did hear there was a previous fire. 
(R. 4421-4423). 
There was absolutely no other mention in the record of the 
Hillsden fire. The sum and substance of the Hillsden fire as the 
evidence came out had no real impact or prejudicial effect to 
Perkins. In fact, the trial judge himself stated on the record 
that evidence of the 1987 Hillsden fire had no effect on the 
outcome of the case: 
Of course, Mr. Campbell [counsel for Perkins] makes a 
great deal as far as the court's ruling, allowing into 
evidence on the first fire. I don't know what impact 
that had on a jury. I do know that, as it came in, the 
impact it had on the court was a lot less than this 
court anticipated it would be, the way Mr. Heath went 
at it and passed over; that it almost, to this court -
- this court did not have - - it did not have any 
impact at all. 
And certainly, it was not the impact, in this court's 
opinion, that Mr. Campbell argues that it had. 
(R. 5160-5161) (Emphasis added). 
The trial court in the instant case in exercising its 
discretion to admit the limited evidence of the 1987 Hillsden 
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fire first determined that the evidence was relevant and then 
determined that its probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect, which is the 
standard under Rule 403, U.R.E. It is not enough for Perkins to 
argue under Rule 403 that the evidence is prejudicial. Most 
evidence is prejudicial to one degree or another. The 
requirement under Rule 403 is much more stringent. Perkins had 
to show the probative value was substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. This she did not do. The 
determination regarding relevancy of evidence is a matter of 
discretion with the trial court and will be reversed only upon a 
showing of manifest abuse of discretion which occurs only when no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. 
Crescent Harbor Water Co. v. Lvseinq. 753 P.2d 555, 559 (Wash. 
App. 1988) . 
It is dispositive that the trial judge himself recognized 
that the evidence regarding the 1987 Hillsden fire and the 
suspicious nature of the May 1990 fire, in the limited scope that 
it was presented to the jury, had little if any impact on the 
trial, and did not unfairly prejudice Perkins. This Court should 
give great deference to the trial judge on matters of evidence 
because he had the advantage of viewing the entire trial. Nelson 
v. Nelson, 513 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Utah 1973); McCuffev v. Turner. 
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5423 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1967). Clearly, the probative value of 
the evidence with respect to Bear River's defense against 
Perkins' claims of bad faith outweighed any prejudicial effect 
that the evidence may have had. 
c. Even If The Trial Court Committed Error In Admitting 
Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden Fire and Evidence that 
the May 19, 1990 Fire Was Intentionally Set, the Error 
was Harmless 
The fact that a trial court may abuse its discretion by 
admitting or excluding evidence does not necessitate, by itself, 
reversal. Slusher v. Ospital. 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989). In 
Slusher, the trial court excluded evidence regarding a settlement 
agreement between plaintiff and one of the defendants. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court had committed error by 
excluding said evidence. However, the Supreme Court also found, 
after considering the totality of the evidence, that the error 
was harmless and did not warrant reversal. The Court stated: 
Of course, the trial court's error does not necessitate 
reversal and the accompanying need for a costly and 
burdensome new trial if the error was harmless i.e., if 
"there is no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989) See, e.g., State 
v. Kniaht, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987); Belden v. 
Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317, 1319, 1321 (Utah Ct. of 
App. 1988) see also Utah Rules Evidence 103(a); Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 61. We conclude that the 
court's error was harmless given the totality of 
circumstances in which it was made. 
Id. at 444. 
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Perkins, in her brief, has failed to cite any evidence which 
even remotely establishes there was a reasonable likelihood that 
the alleged error of the trial court in admitting limited 
evidence of the 1987 Hillsden fire and evidence that the May 19, 
1990 fire was intentionally set affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. Perkins simply claims error and then concludes it 
was prejudicial without even discussing the totality of the 
evidence against her in this case. 
Clearly, Perkins is required to show more than error. She 
must show prejudicial error that is harmful. Prejudice will not 
be presumed on appeal. Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 
780 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1989). In Pacheco the court determined that 
improperly admitted evidence would be considered harmless if 
there is other competent evidence to the same effect upon which a 
jury could reach the same results. Id at 120. Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that there was no prejudicial error. Id. 
Perkins has failed to marshall any evidence to establish a 
reasonable likelihood that the alleged error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings. Frankly, there is no evidence that can be 
marshalled to substantiate Perkins claim. The trial court has 
stated on the record that the evidence had no impact on the 
proceedings. In fact, the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
considered in its totality, establishes that Bear River bent over 
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backwards to adjust this difficult claim in the utmost good 
faith, and that any and all delays, and problems associated 
therewith were caused by Perkins. 
Specifically, Bear River knew immediately after the May 19, 
1990 fire had occurred that Perkins had a previous fire in 1987 
and had intentionally set that fire. Bear River knew immediately 
after the May 19, 1990 fire that that very fire was of a 
suspicious nature. Nevertheless, Bear River responded by 
immediately meeting with Perkins at her residence on the 21st day 
of May, 1990, and at that time advancing monies to Perkins for 
additional living expenses. Even though the Murray City Fire 
Department's investigation of the suspicious fire continued, Bear 
River continued to adjust this claim as they would any other 
claim. After Perkins had entered into a contract with First 
General Services, Bear River advanced $20,000 to First General 
Services when First General Services requested the advance from 
Bear River. 
When Bear River was notified around the first of August, 
1990, that Perkins had terminated First General Services and that 
Bear River should make no further payments to First General 
Services, Bear River fully complied with Perkins directions. 
However, the dispute between Perkins and First General Services 
prevented Bear River from settling the dwelling claim. 
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For several months thereafter Perkins attempted to complete 
the restoration process by hiring additional general contractors 
and subcontractors, including Leo Thorup to complete the 
restoration. Thorup admitted he never submitted a bid to Bear 
River. Bear River did not receive any documentation from Thorup 
until the work was substantially complete. 
With respect to Perkins7 contents claim, Perkins herself 
admitted that a claim was not submitted to Bear River until early 
September 1990. The evidence is further clear that Bear River 
immediately responded and notified Perkins that her claim was 
insufficient in that it was not supported by proper documentation 
and did not contain adequate descriptions of the property. 
Despite Bear River's reasonable requests for further 
documentation, Perkins did not provide any supporting 
documentation, nor did she provide adequate descriptions of the 
content claim she was making. Notwithstanding the obvious 
inadequacy of Perkins' content claim, Bear River, in good faith, 
advanced $10,000 to Perkins thereon in the Fall of 1990. 
The evidence is further clear from Perkins' own bad faith 
expert that an insurance company such as Bear River has every 
right to insist that an insured comply with the requirements and 
provisions of the policy. Yet despite Perkins non-compliance 
with the terms of her insurance policy with Bear River, Bear 
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River still advanced monies without sufficient documentation and 
continued in good faith to try to adjust this claim. 
In early January of 1991 for example, Bear River still did 
not have a properly documented contents claim from Perkins. 
Nonetheless, Bear River assigned a replacement value for Perkins 
content claim of approximately $47,000. Moreover, Bear River 
agreed to raise the cash value from 50% of replacement value to 
75% of replacement value. This offer was presented to Perkins 
who immediately rejected it and instead demanded $52,000 for 
replacement value and that she receive the full amount without 
having to actually replace any items, contrary to the terms of 
the policy. Moreover, Perkins demanded that her additional 
living expense in the amount of $19,000 be paid in full even 
though her demand exceeded policy limits and even though the 
claims made for additional living expense were clearly suspicious 
and false. 
Specifically, Perkins made her claim for additional living 
expenses in the Fall of 1990. Bear River immediately notified 
Perkins that she needed to provide invoices evidencing the amount 
of expense she had incurred. Perkins concocted invoices showing 
her mother charged Perkins for room and board and laundry 
services provided in Utah in an amount exceeding $80.00 per day. 
Incredibly, Perkins' mother made these charges to Perkins for 
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several months when Perkins was not even living in the State of 
Utah. When Bear River challenged these claims, Perkins admitted 
she was not living in the State of Utah during most of the time 
she was claiming the additional living expenses. In fact, at 
trial Perkins withdrew her claim for additional living expenses 
in an attempt to prevent evidence of her chicanery from being 
presented to the jury. 
Perkins7 expert also admitted that Bear River was justified 
in not paying claims that had not been adequately supported with 
documentation pursuant to the policy. Perkins7 expert admitted 
that Bear River had no obligation to pay Perkins7 claim for 
additional living expenses. 
Perkins further attempted to make improvements to her home 
that were beyond the scope of fire restoration, she submitted 
false claims, and submitted duplicate claims. Bear River, 
nevertheless, paid in excess of $91,000 to Perkins. There can be 
no question that the overwhelming weight of evidence in this case 
supports the jury's finding that Bear River did not breach its 
insurance contract with Perkins and that Bear River did not act 
in bad faith. 
In Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) 
the Supreme Court of Utah stated that in a first party bad faith 
action, the insured must establish at a minimum that: (1) the 
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insurer failed to diligently investigate the facts to enable it 
to determine whether a claim is valid; (2) that the insurer did 
not fairly evaluate the claim; and (3) that the insurer did not 
act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. 
Id. at 801. Perkins has failed to marshall any evidence to 
substantiate her bad faith claim. Rather, the evidence 
overwhelmingly establishes that Bear River did immediately and 
diligently investigate the facts to determine whether the claim 
was valid. Bear River fairly evaluated the claim and acted 
promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim. 
Evidence of the 1987 Hillsden Drive fire and evidence that 
the May 19, 1990 fire was intentionally set had little if any 
impact on the outcome of this trial. If the trial court 
committed error, clearly the error was harmless and did not 
affect the outcome of the proceedings. 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Handled Counsel for Bear River's 
Comments in Opening Statement Regarding Insurance Fraud 
a. Mention of Insurance Fraud in Bear River's Opening 
Statement did not warrant a Mistrial 
In answering the amended third-party complaint of 
Perkins, Bear River set forth several affirmative defense. Bear 
River's sixth affirmative defense stated that Perkins had 
intentionally and knowingly submitted or caused to be submitted 
false insurance claims pertaining to the type and value of the 
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real and personal property damage and pertaining to additional 
living expenses, with the intent that Bear River would rely 
thereon. (R. 523). 
During opening statement at trial, counsel for Bear River 
stated that Perkins had submitted claims to Bear River which 
constituted fraud. (R. 2838, 2840, 2843 and 2846). Counsel for 
Perkins, following opening statements, immediately made a motion 
for a mistrial or in the alternative that the trial court 
admonish the jury with regard to the statements made by Bear 
River's counsel concerning insurance fraud. At the conclusion of 
counsel for Perkins argument relating to this motion he stated: 
I therefore stand on the motion, you honor, for a 
mistrial, or in the alternative to admonish the jury. 
(R. 5332). (Emphasis added). 
The court denied Perkins7 Motion for a Mistrial but stated 
that he was somewhat concerned as far as the wording of Bear 
River's answer and in the use of the term fraud and insurance 
fraud. The court then requested that counsel for Perkins and 
counsel for Bear River prepare an admonishment to be read to the 
jury. (R. 5333). 
Counsel for Bear River and counsel for Perkins stipulated 
and agreed upon an instruction that the court could give the jury 
pertaining to the matter of insurance fraud. Counsel for Bear 
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River stated to the court on the record in the presence of 
counsel for Perkins the following: 
Yes, your honor, during the noon recess, we have 
presented to the court, in view of the court's ruling 
this morning on the issue of insurance fraud, a 
suggested and agreed instruction the court can give the 
jury pertaining to the matter of insurance fraud, the 
opening statement, and how the jury should view that 
issue. 
(R. 3216). (Emphasis added). 
Counsel for Bear River made a motion at the same time to 
amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. After hearing 
argument from counsel for Perkins, the court denied Bear River's 
motion to amend the pleading to conform to the evidence with 
respect to the issue of fraud. With the stipulation and 
agreement between counsel for Bear River and counsel for Perkins, 
the court read the statement prepared by counsel for Perkins and 
counsel for Bear River to the jury as follows: 
The record may show that all members of the jury are 
present. In our discussions with counsel, and our 
arguments, we have resolved one matter which we would 
like to call to your attention. I'm going to read a 
statement to you and ask you to listen closely to it, 
and you'll then be considering this statement with all 
of the other things which you consider as far as the 
case is concerned. 
In the opening statement of counsel of Bear River, on 
Monday afternoon, reference was made to the potential 
of showing insurance fraud on the part of third party 
plaintiff and defendant Perkins. 
I instruct you that the court has determined as a 
matter of law that insurance fraud is not an issue in 
41 
this case, and you shall not consider the same in your 
deliberations. 
You shall disregard any reference by Mr. Heath to 
insurance fraud as part of the opening statement. 
That does not mean, however, that Bear River may not 
attempt, to show, under the evidence, that incorrect, 
inaccurate or false statements were made by Ms. Perkins 
in submitting claims to Bear River Insurance Company. 
That is an issue which you may consider in accordance 
with the instructions of law given to you after all the 
evidence has been presented. 
(R. 3221 - 3222). 
Counsel for Bear River's reference to insurance fraud in his 
opening statement was adequately, efficiently and effectively 
handled by the trial court through the admonition that was 
prepared and stipulated to by both counsel for Perkins and 
counsel for Bear River. The trial judge thus did not commit 
error in the way the insurance fraud evidence was handled and in 
the admonition to the jury. 
Regarding statements by counsel, the Supreme Court of Utah 
addressed the issue of improper remarks during closing argument. 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 282 (Utah 1992). The Court 
found that appellant's argument that plaintiff's counsel's 
remarks during closing argument warranted a new trial, was 
without merit. The Court stated that in order to grant a new 
trial based on the misstatements of counsel the lower court must 
have committed plain error. 
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To meet the criteria for application of the plain error 
doctrine, an error must be obvious and harmful. The Court found 
that the misstatement of testimony in the trial court was not 
plain nor obvious. The Court concluded that the 
mischaracterization of testimony did not plainly misrepresent the 
facts of the case and would not add significantly to the jury's 
perception of the events. Id. at 839-840. 
Similarly, the trial court, in the instant case, did not 
commit error by allowing counsel for Bear River, in his opening 
statement, to mention insurance fraud. In fact, not only were 
the comments regarding fraud insignificant in relation to the 
evidence that was put on in the 9 day trial, the trial court 
corrected the problem by admonishing the jury to disregard the 
remarks of Bear River's counsel. 
b, Perkins Has Waived Her Right To Appeal With Respect to 
the Insurance Fraud Issue 
Counsel for Perkins made a Motion for Mistrial relating 
to counsel for Bear River's comments regarding insurance fraud. 
However, counsel for Perkins stated his motion, in the 
alternative: Counsel for Perkins stated as follows: 
I therefore stand on the Motion, your honor, for a 
mistrial, or in the alternative, to admonish the jury. 
(R. 5332). (Emphasis added). 
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The trial court did in fact choose the alternative and 
admonish the jury. In fact, the trial court admonished the jury 
using language drafted and stipulated to by counsel for Perkins 
and counsel for Bear River. The trial court read this admonition 
verbatim. Consequently, Perkins has waived any right to appeal 
on this issue. Perkins requested in the alternative that the 
court admonish the jury. The court did admonish the jury and the 
problem was rectified. 
Perkins alleges in her appellate brief that after the 
admonition to the jury, the trial court confused the jury by 
submitting the issue of fraud to the jury through an inadvertent 
instruction. Perkins never objected at the time to the way the 
trial court dealt with the jury instruction. Following the 
court's admonition to the jury, no other objections or motions 
were made in connection with the insurance fraud issue. 
Therefore, Perkins has waived any right to appeal on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the aforesaid, the trial court's rulings on the 
evidentiary issues should not be reversed and the jury verdict 
and judgment thereon as it pertains to Bear River should be 
affirmed. 
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DATED this J3 day of November, 1995, 
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Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
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